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COMMENTS
THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE EDUCATIONAL ACCREDITING
AGENCY: PROBLEMS IN JUDICIAL SUPERVISION
AND GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION*
The educational accrediting agency is a powerful instrumentality in the
United States-able, with minimal governmental interference, to set policies
and standards in an area of vital concern to the public. As education becomes
more complex, and as our society increasingly relies upon educational training
and upon the standards by which that training is evaluated, the impact which the
accrediting agency will have upon educational institutions and students enrolled
in them will correspondingly increase.' For all its influence, however, the accred-
iting agency occupies an ambiguous legal position. Therefore, in order to lay
the framework for a more thorough understanding of the status of accrediting
agencies in our legal system, this Comment will analyze the actual and potential
judicial and legislative restraints on their activities.
I
TiiE ACCREDITING PROCESS AND ITs ROLE IN THE UNITED STATES
Most foreign countries have established ministries of education or comparable
governmental organs at national, state, or local levels, to oversee their higher
educational systems.2 The situation in the United States, however, is quite
different. The federal government has never attempted to vest complete authority
* The authors wish to express their appreciation to Mr. Michael H. Cardozo, Executive
Director of the Association of American Law Schools and former Professor of Law at The
Cornell Law School, who suggested this study and aided in its development. They also
thank those thirty regional and professional accrediting agencies which replied to question-
naires which were sent out to obtain background information for this study.
1 See Selden, The Washington Post, Oct. 10, 1962, p. A20, col. 6 (letter to the editor):
Disaccreditation of a college or university by a regional association not only
stigmatizes the institution but jeopardizes the admission of students who may wish
to transfer to other institutions. It may hinder the admission of graduates to graduate
schools. And it places in question the accreditation of professional programs of study,
offered by the disapproved institution. Further, disaccreditation of a professional
school is most serious for the students who may later seek licensure for professional
practice in a state in which admission to take the licensure examination is partially
dependent upon graduation from an accredited institution.
See also California State Senate, Report of Fact Finding Comm'n on Education 148 (Gen.
Sess. 1962) where it was stated: "In recent years, accreditation has come to have a vital
meaning in higher education, even to the point of spelling life or death for many of our
collegiate institutions."
2 For example, in the United Kingdom, the University Grants Committee (England's
Ministry of Education has little authority over universities) significantly influences higher
education through the disbursement of tax funds to the universities, which are dependent
for the most part upon public funds for their support. Only the Crown, upon recommendation
of the Privy Council, can charter new universities, but the University Grants Committee
can still exert ultimate control over education through its purse-string power. See Selden,
"The Governance of Higher Education," The Educational Record 317, 320-21 (1964) (pub-
lished by the American Council on Education, Washington, D.C.).
3 Although the regional associations do accredit secondary schools, they are primarily
concerned with higher education. This comment will be limited accordingly.
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over higher education3 in a single body 4 and state regulation has been relatively
insignificant. 5
As a result of governmental noninterference, the upper educational structure in
the United States, dominated by the largely autonomous university, lacked one
of the most characteristic attributes of foreign systems-a single, authoritative
body to establish uniform, national standards and, therefore, a basis for com-
parison and reliance by the public. To remedy this defect, private accrediting
agencies were created, having as their goal the formulation of standards of
proficiency by which educational institutions could be qualitatively evaluated.8
A. Internal Management of the Accrediting Process
At the head of the educational accrediting system is the National Commis-
sion on AccreditingJ created.in 1950 (following a recommendation by a commit-
tee of college presidents) in order to alleviate the chaos and confusion which
then pervaded the accrediting field.8 Its primary purpose is to "accredit"
accrediting agencies.9 At present, six regional ° and approximately thirty"
4 See section beginning prior to note 170 infra.
5 See section beginning prior to note 130 infra.
6 "Accreditation" has been defined as "a process whereby an organization or an
agency recognizes a college or university or a program of study, as having met certain
pre-determined qualification standards." Selden, Accreditation: A Struggle Over Standards
in Higher Education 6 (1960).
7 The National Commission has a constituent membership of seven national organiza-
tions: American Association of Junior Colleges, American Association of Land-Grant
Colleges and State Universities, Association of American Colleges, Association" of American
Universities, Association of State Colleges and Universities, Association of Urban Universities,
and the State Universities Association. Its institutional membership approximates thirteen
hundred colleges and universities whose dues finance its operations. A board of 40-50
college presidents, selected by the constituent members, establishes the Commission's
policies and criteria.
8 The 1949 joint Committee on Accrediting, composed of college presidents, issued a
statement recommending that colleges and universities unite in a plan of "simplifying
procedures, reducing the number of agencies, emphasizing the qualitative appraisal of
institutional achievement, eliminating duplication of examination of institutions, and pre-
serving institutional autonomy in the fulfillment of educational objectives." National
Commission on Accrediting, The Past and the Future: Historical Sketch and Annual Report
4-5 (April 1965). At that time the number of accrediting agencies was increasing, but there
was little cohesion or interdependency between them; it was almost impossible for colleges
and universities to conform to the varying standards of the many associations. The
National Commission was formed in accordance with the joint Committee's stated
objectives and given the specific responsibility of coordinating "the activities of the
approved accrediting agencies in order to avoid duplication and overlapping of functions..."
National Commission on Accrediting, Constitution.
9 The National Commission, in order to promote unification and coordination, has
attempted to keep the number of approved agencies within reasonable bounds. A profes-
sional accrediting agency will not be admitted to the National Commission's membership
unless a definite need in the particular area exists and the agency's jurisdiction will not
encroach upon that of an existing member association.
10 North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Northwest Association
of Secondary and Higher Schools, Western Association of Schools and Colleges, Southern
Association of Colleges and Schools, New England Association of Colleges and Secondary
Schools, and the Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools.
For a description of the duties and functions of the regional associations, see Selden,
"Where Do We Go From Here?" 29 Exceptional Children 203, 204 (No. 5, Jan. 1963);
Accreditation in Higher Education 42-73 (Blauch, ed. 1959).
11 National Architectural Accrediting Board, National Association of Schools of Art,
American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business, American Chemical Society,
American Dental Association, Engineers' Council for Professional Development, Association
of American Law Schools, Society of American Foresters, American Council on Education
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professional accrediting agencies have met the National Commission's criteria
for acceptance.' 2 In general, a regional agency accredits the public and private
universities and colleges within its jurisdiction, evaluating each institution's
over-all program while concentrating on the undergraduate level. Professional
agencies approve specific programs of study, and their jurisdiction is national in
scope. The National Commission has attempted to assure some degree of uni-
formity and interrelation between the regional and professional associations by
requiring that a professional agency 13 make "continual and reasonable efforts to
coordinate its accrediting procedures with the several regional accrediting
associations" and rely "on the regional associations to evaluate the general
qualities of institutions."'14 Although there are variations among each agency's
techniques and procedures of accreditation, they can be described generally as
follows:' 5 (1) the association establishes certain minimum standards which
each educational institution must meet in order to receive accreditation; (2)
representatives of the association visit each institution to observe and interview; 1 6
(3) the information obtained, in addition to data submitted by the school itself
following a process of self-analysis, is presented to a review committee; (4) ac-
creditation is granted or denied, each decision being appealable to a higher
internal body.17
B. Accrediting Agencies' Insistence Upon Autonomy
Accrediting agencies have reconciled the conflicting interests of unity on
the one hand, and institutional autonomy on the other.'$ The National Corn-
for Journalism, American Society of Landscape Architects, American Bar Association,
American Library Association, American Medical Association, Liaison Committee on
Medical Education, National Assocation of Schools of Music, National League for
Nursing, Inc., American Optometric Association, American Council on Pharmaceutical
Education, American Psychological Association, American Public Health Association,
Council on Social Work Education, American Speech and Hearing Association, National
Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education, American Association of Theological
Schools in the United States and Canada, and the American Veterinary Medical
Association.
For a description of the duties and functions of the professional associations, see National
Commission on Accrediting, "Procedures of Accrediting Education in the Professions"
(March 1964) (series of reports issued by the Commission); Gitler, "Accreditation:
Agencies, Practices, and Procedures," 1 Journal of Education for Librarianship 61-74 (No.
2, 1960).
12 See National Commission on Accrediting, Facts About the Commission: Criteria for
Recognized Accrediting Agencies (pamph., 1964).
13 The National Commission once made a concerted effort to abolish the professional
agencies in order to place all accreditation authority in the regional associations. A number of
educators felt that the professional associations interfered too often in administrative
decisions and that the regional groups would be better equipped to promote conformity
and uniformity. The movement failed, however, after meeting heavy resistance from pro-
fessors and the professional agencies themselves. See National Commission on Accrediting,
Historical Sketch and Annual Report, supra note 8.
14 National Commission on Accrediting, supra note 12.
15 See generally the authorities cited in notes 10 and 11 supra.
16 Generally the visiting committees are composed of professors, administrative officials,
and other representatives of accredited institutions. But in professional associations,
prominent members of the profession, not necessarily attached to accredited institutions,
often help conduct the investigations.
17 See text accompanying notes 45-46 infra.
18 The National Commission requires that an agency "recognize the right of an
institution to be appraised in the light of its own stated purposes so long as those purposes
demonstrably fall within the definitions of general quality established by the agency."
National Commission on Accrediting, supra note 12, No. 11(b).
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mission and the regional and professional associations for the most part
have refrained from interfering with an educational institution's exercise of
discretion in individual matters.' 9 Accrediting agencies are concerned primarily
with the general policies of institutions and insist that these policies be consistent
with agency standards. Isolated violations of a standard will not result in
censure or disaccreditation if the course of action taken is consistent with the
broad educational aims of the school.2° This compromise produces some degree
of uniformity and thereby promotes reliance on accreditation; yet it also allows
room for innovation and freedom of action by each institution.
It is this emphasis on institutional autonomy which underlies one of the
primary, and perhaps most controversial, policies of accrediting agencies. They
generally refuse to recognize any institution not professing "integrity of
operation" 21--. e., freedom from political and governmental interference. 22
Insistence upon integrity of operation led'the Southern Association of Colleges
and Schools to threaten disaccreditation of all state colleges and universities in
Mississippi when the governor of the state became involved in the 1962 racial
problems of Mississippi's schools. 23 This same demand for operational integrity
led the Southern Association to threaten disaccreditation of North Carolina
University in 1965,24 after the state legislature had passed a statute forbidding
any subversive or communist-affiliated individual, or anyone pleading the fifth
amendment in governmental investigations into subversive activities, from
speaking on state campuses. 25
Interference with the educational process, however, need not necessarily come
from government. For example, a series of faculty dismissals at St. John's
University recently led to an investigation by the Middle States Association of
Colleges and Secondary Schools. 26 A major issue in the faculty-administration
19 National Commission on Accrediting, Constitution:
The acts, rulings, and recommendations of the Commission with respect to accrediting
are not binding upon the individual institutional members, whose freedom of action and
self-government remain inviolate. Nevertheless, all member institutions . . . obligate
themselves to consult with and inform the Commission before undertaking action
contrary to the rulings and recommendations of the Commission.
20 See Cardozo, "Accreditation of Law Schools in the United States," 18 J. Legal Ed.
423-24 (1966).
21 William K. Selden, former Executive Secretary of the National Commission, has
said that "no college .or university which is subject to dictation or interference in its
internal affairs by a Governor can be considered to possess integrity of operation." The
Washington Post, Oct. 10, 1962, p. A20, col. 6 (letter to the editor).
22 "One of the fundamental and basic traditions of this country has been the freedom of
higher education from political interference and dictation." Selden, "Current National
Issues in Accreditation," 30 Junior College Journal 534, 538 (May 1960).
23 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1962, p. 40, col. 4; id., Oct. 10, 1962, p. 33, col. 6; id., Sept.
27, 1962, p. 28 col. 3. See also The Washington Post, supra note 21.
24 N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1965, p. 124, col. 4; id., Oct. 17, 1965, p. 62, col. 3; id., June 5,
1965, p. 31, col. 2.
25 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-99 (Supp. 1963). The statute is extensively discussed in
Comment, 42 N.C.L. Rev. 179 (1963). This threat of disaccreditation was subsequently
withdrawn by the Southern Association when a special session of the North Carolina
General Assembly amended the provision barring Communist speakers. N. Y. Times, Dec. 2,
1965, p. 45, col. 1. The amended statute gives trustees of the state university authority to
regulate the appearances of Communist speakers. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-99 (Supp. 1965).
Some problems still arise under the new law. See N. Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1966, p. 42, col. 5
(city ed.).
26 N.Y. Times, May 1, 1966, p. 1, col. 1; id., April 30, 1966, p. 25, col. 1; id., Jan. 1,
1966, p. 21 col. 1.
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conflict there concerned the status of academic freedom in the environment of
a church-related school.2 7 Similarly, in a case recently filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia,28 the Middle States Association
refused to accredit a proprietary school because of its profit motive2 9 Since
the accrediting agency may believe that educational quality is impaired by the
influence of a board of directors seeking profit for the corporation's shareholders,
operational integrity could also be at the basis of this dispute.
These incidents indicate that refusals and withdrawals of accreditation present
problems of increasing importance. Since courts may soon become the forum for
controversies (as in the proprietary school case), it is important to explore
the possible approaches which they may adopt in determining (1) whether
judicial relief is available, and (2) if so, under what circumstances and measured
by what standards.
II
JUDICIAL SUPERVISION oF ACCRDITATION ACTMTIES
The educational accrediting agency is a private, nonprofit,30 voluntary associa-
tion.3 1 As such, it belongs to a broad and rather loosely defined legal category,
encompassing any body of individuals or groups which have united in a
somewhat formal structure to effectuate common purposes and goals. 2 Though
there is a substantial body of authority which purports to affect voluntary associa-
tions in general, the common law has not yet been forced to define and regulate
the educational accrediting agency in particular. These agencies have certain
distinctive characteristics which seem beyond the scope of general association
law, and, at any rate, that law is too broad to be determinative of the extent to
which accrediting agencies can be supervised by the courts.
Most educational accrediting agencies are now incorporated,33 and this has
helped to clarify their legal status.34 But it does not solve the difficult problems
27 Id., Jan. 11, 1966, p. 18, col. 1, 3; id., April 24, 1966, p. 57, col. 1. See also id., Dec. 17,
1965, p. 1, col. 6.28 Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary
Schools, Civil No. 1515-66, U.S. Dist. Ct., D.C., (complaint filed June 10, 1966).
29 Complaint, Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges &
Secondary Schools, supra note 28.
30 This nonprofit aspect of educational accrediting agencies separates them from business
enterprises, such as joint-stock associations, which are more susceptible to governmental
regulation because of their commercial character.
31 See generally 7 C.J.S. "Associations" § 1 (1937); 4 Am. Jur. "Associations and Clubs"§§ 1-3 (1936). See also North Dakota v. North Central Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary
Schools, 23 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. Ill.), aff'd, 99 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1938). The National
Commission on Accrediting recognizes only "voluntary, non-profit" accrediting agencies.
National Commission on Accrediting, supra note 12, No. 1.
32 See Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations and Associations §§ 4, 17 (1956); Developments
in the Law, "Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations," 76 Harv. L. Rev. 983,
985 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law].
33 Of the 28 accrediting agencies which responded to questionnaires, 23 were incorporated.
Many have only recently attained this status; the Middle States Association, for instance,
was incorporated early in 1966 in New York. Apparently, the primary reason for incorpo-
ration is the desire to insulate association officers from potential personal liability. See Ga.
Code Ann. § 3-121 (1962) for an example of a statute under which officers of unincorpo-
rated associations could be held personally liable. This protection from personal liability
after incorporation is offset by the problems and cost of refiling for a tax exemption under
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 501(c), incorporation being a "material change" under that statute.
Rev. Rul. 617, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 260.
34 Nonprofit and general corporation laws help define the legal structure of an educa-
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of when refusals to accredit and withdrawals of accreditation may be challenged,
and of what substantive law to apply in such actions. Here the law of voluntary
associations, to the extent that it applies, provides the only available starting
point.3 5
A. Prerequisites to Judicial Interference With an Association's Internal
Affairs
Courts have generally adhered to a policy of noninterference with the
internal affairs of associations.8 6 Because they are private and voluntary, because
they usually operate in areas of little concern to the public, and because they
are designed to thrive on autonomy, associations have generally been free from
court supervision. When the problem is one concerning membership, a non-
member denied admission usually has no basis for bringing suit since he has no
right to participate in the organization.3 7 A member who has been expelled
has a somewhat better basis for court intervention, but it too is quite limited.
When a party joins an association, a kind of contractual relationship is said to
arise, with the rules of the association serving as the terms of the contract.38 The
member agrees, at least implicitly, to abide by the rules of the association and to
accept its decisions as binding. Therefore, because he has accepted the as-
sociation's authority as basic to the relationship into which he has voluntarily
entered, he cannot normally obtain judicial relief.89
The common-law membership cases are relevant in analyzing the legal impact
of accreditation activities, since all of the regional and some of the professional
accrediting agencies extend membership status to accredited schools. In many
of the professional agencies, on the other hand, membership is not a consequence
of accreditation. On the basis of the common law, therefore, it could be argued
that schools accredited by the latter agencies, being nonmembers, normally have
no claim to judicial relief whatsoever. But this distinction would seem to be
of little relevance within the context of accreditation. It is submitted that
accreditation itself is a type of membership status which deserves protection
from wrongful acts of the accrediting body. The operative factor in each instance
tional accrediting agency. See note 157 infra. Incorporation also helps to solve the problem
of diversity jurisdiction and of legal entity status for purposes of suit. See note 158 infra
and accompanying text.
35 If an organization is incorporated it is sometimes not considered a part of the
voluntary associations category. See 7 C.J.S. "Associations" § 1(c) (1) (1937). It seems that
for purposes of the present analysis, however, the substantive law of voluntary associations
would be equally applicable to the incorporated accrediting agency. See, e.g., Chapman v.
American Legion, 244 Ala. 553, 14 So. 2d 225 (1943); Gold Knob Outdoor Advertising Co.
v. Outdoor Advertising Ass'n, 225 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Chafee, "The In-
ternal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit," 43 Harv. L. Rev. 993, 996 (1930) ("for the
most part the presence or absence of the corporate form does not seem to affect our
problems").
86 See generally Annots., 20 A.L.R.2d 531, 537-39 (1951); 175 A.L.R. 438, 506 (1948).
37 See note 71 infra and accompanying text.
38 Dingwall v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Ry. Employees, 4 Cal. App. 565, 569, 88 Pac.
597, 599 (Dist. Ct. App. 1906); Radio Station KHF v. Local 297, American Fed'n of
Musicians, 169 Kan. 596, 602, 220 P.2d 199, 205 (1950); Brown v. Stoerkel, 74 Mich. 269,
276, 41 N.W. 921, 923 (1889).
39 No inference that associations are completely controlled by ordinary principles of con-
tract is here intended. The contract analogy is not sound in all situations. Chafee, supra note
35, at 1001-07. But the analogy is useful to illustrate generally the nature of associational rela-
tionships, and it helps explain the judicial self-restraint evident in this area.
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is that the school comes to rely on its accredited status and stands to be greatly
harmed when that status is questioned or withdrawn.
Assuming, then, that a situation arises in which judicial intervention may be
warranted (this problem will be subsequently discussed), there are two roadblocks
which must first be passed: exhaustion of remedies and the lack of a proper
remedy.
(1) Exhaustion of Remedies. Before a member may seek judicial relief from
wrongful acts of the association, he must exhaust all remedies available to him
within the framework of the association 4°-unless this would be futile or could
not provide proper redress.41 Though a good argument to the contrary can be
made,42 the rule requiring exhaustion does not apply to nonmembers, since they
have never agreed to abide by the rules of the association providing for internal
appeal 3s
The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is applicable to suits against an
educational accrediting agency.4 4 Since procedures for internal appeal have gen-
erally been established,45 exhaustion may be an issue in future litigation. The
National Commission on Accrediting, in fact, requires as a condition for recogni-
tion that an agency provide "a regular means whereby the chief administrative
officer of an institution may appeal to the final authority in that agency."46
Procedures established pursuant to this provision would permit internal appeal
by schools seeking accreditation as well as by schools already accredited, although
under the prevailing view of exhaustion an applicant school would not be barred
from the courts for failure to do so.
(2) Availability of Proper Remedy. The remedy for wrongful acts of an
educational accrediting agency is likely to be equitable in nature, and this
presents another possible limitation on access to the courts. Traditionally,
equity protected only property rights, and a party aggrieved by the act of a
voluntary association had to allege violation of a property interest before equity
would intervene.47 Since the reputation of a school is the predominant interest
affected by accreditation activities, and since this is arguably a personal interest,
it might be difficult to obtain equitable relief from the acts of an accrediting
40 See generally Annots., 20 A.L.R.2d 344, 384-87 (1951) ; 20 A.L.R.2d 421, 486-87 (1951);
20 A.L.R.2d 531, 564-65 (1951); Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1069-80.
41 Blenko v. Schmeltz, 362 Pa. 365, 372-73, 67 A.2d 99, 102 (1949); Brown v. Harris
County Medical Soc'y, 194 S.W. 1179, 1181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).42 See Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1072: Comment, "Exhaustion of
Remedies in Private, Voluntary Associations," 65 Yale L.J. 369, 387 (1956).
43 See Porth v. Local 201, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 171 Kan. 177, 180-81, 231 P.2d 252,
254-55 (1951) (by implication); Comment, "Exhaustion of Remedies in Private, Voluntary
Associations," 65 Yale L.J. 369, 386-87 (1956).
44 North Dakota v. North Central Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, 23 F. Supp.
694, 700 (E.D. Ill. 1938).
45 See National Commission on Accrediting, supra note 11.
46 National Commission on Accrediting, supra note 12, No. 7. In its constitution, the
National Commission is also pledged to "establish a method or procedure whereby member
institutions may present grievances with respect to actions of accrediting agencies." National
Commission on Accrediting, Constitution, purpose No. 8. Since under this provision "the
Commission does not adjudicate the question of whether a particular institution should be
accredited by a particular agency," National Commission on Accrediting, supra note 12, it is
not a procedure which a school would be required to pursue under the exhaustion doctrine.
Rather, it is a method by which the National Commission itself can promote the internal
solution of conflicts and thereby prevent judicial intervention.
47 Rigby v. Connol, 14 Ch. D. 482 (1880); Chafee, supra note 35, at 998.
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agency in a jurisdiction which still adheres to the traditional view. However,
this view is of declining importance today. Under the modem approach, equity
will protect personal interests as well as property rights. 48 Since this new view
extends to actions against voluntary associations, 49 it should serve to liberalize
access to equity for relief from wrongful acts of accrediting agencies.
Mandamus is a second possible remedy.50 Although the writ generally does
not issue to enforce purely private rights, "the fact that a private association
... is incorporated may be held enough to permit the use of mandamus to com-
pel the performance of its corporate duties, even though they would not ordinarily
be considered public in nature."5 1 Alternatively, the fact that educational
accrediting associations occupy a quasi-public status5 2 may make mandamus a
proper remedy for their wrongful acts.5 3
At any rate, a school would have to show that it had been harmed by the
action of an educational accrediting agency before a court would recognize its
claim. Harm is likely to result in two situations: (1) expulsion cases-the
withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of accreditation; and (2) exclusion cases-
the withholding of accreditation from an applicant school.54
B. Expulsion Cases: Withdrawal or Threatened Withdrawal of Accreditation
Recent incidents in Mississippi, in North Carolina, and at St. John's
University illustrate the types of problems which may arise when an agency
resorts to actual or threatened expulsion. 55 Though these incidents never resulted
in litigation, one expulsion controversy has come before the courts. In North
Dakota v. North Central Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools,56 the
Governor of North Dakota filed suit for a temporary injunction to restrain the
48 See Annot., 175 A.L.R. 438 (1948); see generally Developments in the Law, supra note
32, at 999-1000.
49 Berrien v. Pollitzer, 165 F.2d 21 (D.C. 1947); see Annot., 175 A.L.R. 438 (1948).
50 Declaratory judgment is another possibility, particularly if the problem is one of threat-
ened disaccreditation. A fourth alternative is a tort action. Defamation would be the most
likely possibility. See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1005. A defama-
tion action could be useful in cases of wrongful refusal of accreditation as well as in cases
of actual or threatened withdrawal, since any such action by an accrediting agency is likely
to be widely publicized and can vitally affect a school's reputation. There may be a difficulty,
however, in categorizing a damages action in any of the conventional tort classifications. See
Morrison v. NBC, 24 App. Div. 2d 284, 266 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1st Dep't 1965) for an example
of the possible schematic problems which could result. There, the court found actionable
injury based on harm to a professor's academic reputation, even though the complaint
sounded in none of the traditional tort categories, including defamation.
51 Chafee, supra note 35, at 1013. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at
1096. For cases indicating the unavailability of mandamus against an unincorporated associa-
tion, see Annot., 137 A.L.R. 311 (1942).
r2 See text accompanying notes 107-128 infra.
53 The writ has issued in the past against bodies exercising public educational duties. See,
e.g., Stephens v. Humphrey, 145 Ark. 172, 224 S.W. 442 (1920); Cook v. School Dist. No. 80,
266 311. 164, 107 N.E. 327 (1914).
54 This Comment is concerned only with actions brought against an accrediting agency by
a school. It is worth considering, however, whether a student at a school whose accreditation
has been withdrawn, or whose application for accreditation has been refused, could bring
suit against the accrediting agency. Harm to the student is likely, since many states will not
license persons to practice in certain professions unless they have graduated from accredited
schools. See notes 107-09 infra and accompanying text. But there would be problems in
formulating a theory of recovery. See Morrison v. NBC, supra note 50. And if a tort action
were brought, proximate cause would be a major obstacle.
5 See notes 23-27 supra and accompanying text.
56 23 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. 3Il.), aff'd, 99 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1938).
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North Central Association from withdrawing the State Agricultural College from
its accredited list. The Association had investigated the school after the state's
Board of Administration fired several of the school's personnel, allegedly without
cause and without opportunity to be heard. When the investigation revealed that
the firing had affected the morale of the faculty and jeopardized the quality of
education, the Association threatened isaccreditation. The court denied the
governor's request for an injunction, concluding that "in the absence of fraud,
collusion, arbitrariness, or breach of contract, such as give rise to a civil action,
the decisions of such voluntary associations must be accepted in litigation before
the court as conclusive . . .,,5
Though this decision provides a beginning for analyzing the question of
whether or not a withdrawal or threatened withdrawal of accreditation is
unlawful, it is only a beginning. More helpful is Chafee's analysis of the three
requirements of lawful expulsion from a voluntary association. 8
Under the first requirement, expulsion must be accomplished consistently with
the rules of the association. If the action is violative of the rules, the associational
contract"9 will have been breached and judicial relief will generally be available.60
Secondly, the expulsion proceedings must have been undertaken in good faith.61
This requirement is broad enough to encompass the "fraud, collusion, or
arbitrariness" standard of the North Central Association case,6 2 as well as
similar standards of malice, partiality, or prejudice; evidence of any of these
elements can amount to bad faith, thereby serving as a basis for invalidating
the expulsion even if it technically had been done in accordance with the rules.
The third requirement is that the action taken, and the rules upon which it was
premised, are not contrary to "natural justice. '68 This test is similar to that of
good faith in that it embodies notions of fairness, but it is more concerned with
the procedures used than with the motives behind the action taken. The concept
of "natural justice" is nebulous at best; it is sufficient here to say that it requires,
primarily, that the expelled member be afforded procedural safeguards such as
notice and an opportunity to be heard.64
In testing the validity of a withdrawal of accreditation by an educational
accrediting agency, however, the above would provide onily a framework; general
principles are of limited use, since the precise inquiry in any case should depend
upon the type of association involved.
57 Id. at 699. Accord, Robinson v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 45 Il. App. 2d 277,
195 N.E.2d 38 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965); State ex rel. Ohio High School
Athletic Ass'n v. Judges of the Court of Common Pleas, 173 Ohio St. 239, 181 N..2d 261
(1962.) The courts in these cases relied upon the "contract theory" of associations (discussed
in text accompanying notes 38-39 supra). This theory is often the legal basis for the judicial
policy of noninterference with the internal affairs of voluntary associations.
58 Chafee, supra note 35, at 1014-20. These requirements originated with the case of
Dawkins v. Antrobus, 17 Ch. D. 615 (1881).
59 See text accompanying notes 38-39, 57 supra.
60 Lawson v. Hewell, 118 Cal. 613, 50 Pac. 763 (1897); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224
App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435 (4th Dep't 1928); Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 531, 546-47 (1951);
Chafee, supra note 35, at 1018-20.
61 Stevenson v. Holstein-Friesian Ass'n, 30 F.2d 625, 627-28 (2d Cir. 1929); Annots., 20
A.L.R.2d 344, 361-64 (1951); 20 A.L.R.2d 531, 544-46 (1951); Chafee, supra note 35, at
1020.
62 See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
63 Chafee, supra note 35, at 1015-18; Annots., 20 A.L.R.2d 344, 352 (1951); 20 A.L.R.2d
531, 539 (1951).
64 See text accompanying notes 92-97 infra.
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[T]he law of associations does not wholly depend upon the consensual
elements of the relation between the member and the group, but such
elements may be supplemented, modified, or disregarded according to the
function of the particular group in the community.65
This thesis has particular relevance in the accrediting field. Because of public
concern for and reliance upon accreditation, courts might be more likely to
invalidate a disaccreditation which is contrary to the public interest than one
which is consistent with it. Because of the quasi-public function of accrediting
agencies,60 courts might inquire as to whether the disaccreditation is appropriate
to the agency's purposes. 67 And because of the extreme consequences of
disaccreditation upon the school involved, courts would probably be more inclined
to interfere with the affairs of an accrediting agency than with those of other
associations. 68
On the other hand, the accrediting agency's interest in autonomy and its
special competence in formulating educational standards are important con-
siderations; courts may desire both to preserve the value of autonomy 69 and to
defer to the expertise of the agency. 70 The weight to be accorded these argu-
ments, as opposed to those above, is uncertain. But it seems clear that a court
should recognize both groups of arguments, evaluate the strength of the factors
in each, and balance one group against the other.
C. Exclusion Cases: the Refusal of an Applicant's Request for Accreditation
The factors involved in determining the validity of an expulsion, discussed
above, would be relevant if a court were to reach the merits in an exclusion
case. But the primary question is the threshold one: under what circumstances
is judicial intervention warranted?
An applicant that has been denied membership in a voluntary association
stands in a far different position than does an expelled member. Judicial relief from
wrongful expulsion is granted to protect rights previously gained through
membership itself; a nonmember seeking admission has the benefit of none of
those rights. As a general rule, a court cannot compel the granting of member-
ship in a voluntary association, for that membership is a privilege and not a
right; no matter how arbitrary or unjust the rejection may be, there is no legal
remedy.71
This rule is subject to one major exception. When a private association is
the only group operating in an area of vital public concern, it enjoys a sort of
monopoly power; if that power, because of public reliance upon it, becomes
great enough to make membership a necessity for successful operation in that
area, courts may intervene" 2 If the applicant meets the admission standards
65 Chafee, supra note 35, at 1005. [Emphasis added.]
66 See text accompanying notes 107-28 infra.
67 See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 996, 1011.
68 See generally Chafee, supra note 35, at 1021-22; Developments in the Law, supra note
32, at 996.69 See generally Chafee, supra note 35, at 1027-29.
70 See text accompanying notes 80-81; see generally Chafee, supra note 35, at 1023-26.
71 Kronen v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 237 Cal. App. 2d 289, 301, 46 Cal. Rptr.
808, 816 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, ,384 U.S. 905 (1966); Gold Knob Outdoor
Advertising Co. v. Outdoor Advertising Ass'n, 225 S.W.2d 645, 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949);
Annot., 89 AL..R.2d 964, 966-68, 971-74 (1951).
72 James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 731, 155 P.2d 329, 335 (1944); Falcone v.
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of the group-at least insofar as they are not contrary to public policy-and
his admission would not subvert the group's basic purposes, the granting of
membership in the association may be compelled. This principle has been applied
to labor unions73 and professional associations, 74 and similar reasoning may well
be applicable to educational accrediting associations. Society has come to rely
on accreditation as a means of judging the quality of education; employers,
schools, and especially state licensing boards now depend heavily upon educa-
tional standards maintained through the process of accreditation. 5 Because of
this public reliance, and because of the action and policy of the National Com-
mission-which has successfully cut down the number of accrediting agencies
so that normally only one agency is recognized in each region or profession 76-
accreditation has become akin to a monopoly power. The accrediting agency,
seen in this light, is not a truly "voluntary" association, 77 since accreditation
is a virtual necessity for the successful operation of a school. Neither is it a
truly "private" association,78 for it fulfills a public function and may more
properly be classed as a quasi-public agency. 79 These factors-monopoly power
and public function-may render an accrediting agency's admission policies
susceptible to judicial scrutiny. Thus, an unjust or arbitrary refusal to accredit
would not seem to be beyond the jurisdiction of the courts.
The method of operation of the accrediting agency, however, militates against
judicial acceptance of the supervisory role suggested above. Accrediting agencies
do not monitor every act of member schools. Rather, they set general standards80
and require that schools meet those standards to be eligible for accreditation.
This standard-setting role necessitates expertise. The educators and members
of the professions set the standards and formulate the policies for enforcing
them, and courts, lacking such expertise, should be reluctant to interfere.81 If
the agency is functioning for the benefit of the public and, to that end, its
Medical Soc'y of Middlesex County, 34 NJ. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1962); Kurk v. Medical
Soc'y of Queens County, Inc., 46 Misc. 2d 790, 260 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1965), rev'd on other grounds, 24 App. Div. 2d 897, 264 N.Y.S.2d 859 (2d Dep't 1965). See
also Chafee, supra note 35, at 1022-23; Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 993-94,
1040.
73 James v. Marinship Corp., supra note 72:
Where a union has . . .attained a monopoly of the supply of labor ... such a union
occupies a quasi-public position . . . and it has certain corresponding obligations.
It may no longer claim the same freedom from legal restraint enjoyed by golf clubs or
fraternal associations. Its asserted right to choose its own members does not merely
relate to social relations; it affects the fundamental right to work for a living.
74 Falcone v. Medical Soc'y of Middlesex County, supra note 72, at 597, 170 A.2d at 799:
[Tihe County Medical Society possesses ...a virtual monopoly over the use of local
hospital facilities . . . .Public policy strongly dictates that this power should not be
unbridled but should be viewed judicially as a fiduciary power to be exercised in a
reasonable and lawful manner ....
See also Kurk v. Medical Soc'y of Queens County, Inc., supra note 72.
75 See text accompanying notes 107-11 infra.
76 See notes 8-9 supra.
77 See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
78 See text accompanying note 30 supra.
79 See text accompanying notes 107-28 infra.
80 For a general discussion of the private association as a vehicle for setting and enforcing
standards, see Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1046-49. See also text accompany-
ing note 20 supra.
81 See generally Chafee, supra note 35, at 1023-26.
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standards are cast in the public interest, judicial scrutiny should yield to the
competence of the accrediting specialists.
The acceptance of jurisdiction in exclusion cases, then, should depend upon
a balancing of three factors: (1) the extent of the accrediting agency's monopoly
power; (2) the degree to which that monopoly power is being abused; and
(3) the extent to which the accrediting agency is relying on its special com-
petence, i.e., interpreting and enforcing its own standards. The stronger the
reliance of society upon the standards of the agency, the greater is the harm the
agency can impose upon an excluded school and the greater is the monopoly
power of the agency. The less publicly-oriented are the actions and policies
of the agency, the greater is the likelihood that the monopoly power is being..,
abused. When the degree of power and extent of abuse become significant
enough to outweigh the deference paid expertise, courts may justifiably
intervene.8 2
D. Procedural Safeguards in Accreditation Proceedings
Procedural regularity is relevant in testing the validity of any expulsion or
exclusion from an educational accrediting agency. Proper notice of the proceed-
ings and of adverse information being considered, adequate opportunity to
present a defense, and a fair hearing on each material issue are all important
considerations. An accredited school would seem to have a more obvious claim
to such treatment than an applicant school seeking accreditation, because
many of its rights may stem from the fact of accreditation itself.88 But because
accrediting agencies fulfill a public function and utilize a kind of monopoly
power,84 courts may require that fair procedures be employed even in exclusion
cases. This would be especially true if the fourteenth amendment were found
to apply.85
Fair procedures may be required of an accrediting agency on three different
levels. At the lowest level, courts might insist that an accrediting agency follow
its own procedural rules.86 Violation of its constitution or by-laws, causing an
82 See Complaint, Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges &
Secondary Schools, Civil No. 1519-66, U.S. Dist. Ct., D.C. (filed June 10, 1966). The case is
discussed at text accompanying notes 28 and 29 supra, and 187-94 infra. Though it is
brought under the federal antitrust laws, it presents factual allegations which could well be
used to test the above theories. Plaintiff alleges that defendant and the other regional associa-
tions have "conspired for the purpose of ...monopolizing ... for non-profit institutions
the field of higher education," id., p. 5, allegation 4; that "continued adherence to defendant's
policy of excluding proprietary institutions from eligibility for evaluation and accreditation
will result in irreparable damage to plaintiff, and ... thereby eliminate plaintiff from compe-
tition in the field of higher education," id., p. 10, allegation 12; and that "the conduct of
defendant.., is clearly opposed to the public interest... ," id., p. 9, allegation 10. On the
other hand, defendant seems to be relying on its special competence in refusing to accredit
proprietary institutions. But it is interesting to note in this regard that defendant has not
inspected plaintiff school and found that its quality does not meet the standards of the
agency; rather, defendant has refused to accept plaintiff's application for evaluation and
accreditation. Under these circumstances, an argument that defendant is relying on its own
special competence might carry less weight than it would if defendant had actually inspected
plaintiff school and found it to be of substandard quality.
83 See text accompanying note 71 supra.
84 See text accompanying notes 75-79 supra.
85 See text accompanying notes 98-128 infra.
86 See notes 59-60 supra and accompanying text.
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irregularity in the proceedings, may void the agency's decision; the extent of the
irregularity and the degree of unfairness it engenders, however, are necessary
considerations. 87 The lack of a mere technical formality would not be grounds for
court review.88
In most instances, procedural safeguards would be afforded both accredited
and nonaccredited schools at the lowest level. Accrediting agencies generally
establish fair and comprehensive procedures governing their decisions on the
extension or revocation of accreditation. The National Commission on Accredit-
ing, in fact, requires that all approved agencies follow procedures whereby the
institution concerned evaluates itself as part of the accrediting process,89 its
faculty and staff have opportunity to consult with the visitation team,90 a
written report of the evaluation is made available to the institution, and an
opportunity to comment upon it is extended.) But problems may arise con-
cerning the fairness of procedures used at the time of the actual decision on
accreditation, rather than at the time of the evaluation. The second level of
procedural safeguards then becomes more important.
The procedures of an association, at the second level, should conform to
accepted standards of administrative procedure. 92 Application of this theory
may depend on the character of the right being protected. 98 But it is not
necessary that the procedures be provided for in the rules, and the theory would
operate even if the rules explicitly provided that normal administrative pro-
cedures need not be followed. Fair hearing,94 proper notice of the proceedings95
and of the charges levied,96 and the opportunity to present a defense9 7 have
all been afforded members of associations under this approach. Educational
accrediting agencies, it seems, would similarly be required to comply with such
standards. The interests involved and the potential for harm inherent in dis-
accreditation (and perhaps the refusal to accredit) indicate that fair proceedings
can be obtained only by affording appropriate procedural safeguards.
At the highest level, procedures conforming to the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment arguably could be required of an educational accrediting
87 See generally Annots., 20 A.L.R.2d 344, 364-80 (1951) ; 20 A.L.R.2d 531, 550-53 (1951).
88 See Yeomans v. Union League Club, 225 Ill. App. 234 (1922); Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 344,
369-70 (1951).
89 National Commission on Accrediting, Facts About the Commission: Criteria for
Recognized Accrediting Agencies No. 11(i) (pamph., 1964).
90 Id., No. 11(k).
91 Id., No. 11(1).
92 This requirement is similar to the "natural justice" test. See text accompanying notes
63-64, supra.
93 E.g., members of benevolent societies are usually entitled to notice and hearing before
expulsion. See Annot., 27 A.L.R. 1512, 1513-14 (1923). This is because a "property interest"
is involved, the presence of which requires that "fundamental due process must be observed."
Schwankert v. New Jersey State Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 77 N.J. Super. 224, 228-30,
185 A.2d 877, 880-81 (Super. Ct. 1962).
94 Virgin v. American College of Surgeons, 42 IMI. App. 2d 352, 192 N.E.2d 414 (1963).
See Annots., 20 A.L.R.2d 344, 353 (1951); 20 A.L.R.2d 531, 540 (1951).
95 Swital v. Real Estate Comm'r, 116 Cal. App. 2d 677, 254 P.2d 587 (Dist. Ct. App.
1953). See Annots., 20 A.L.R.2d 344, 355-56 (1951) ; 20 A.L.R.2d 531, 542 (1951).
96 Stein v. Marks, 44 Misc. 140, 89 N.Y. Supp. 921 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1904). See
Annot., 20 AL.R.2d 344, 356-58 (1951).
97 Norman v. Roosevelt Democratic Club, 17 Misc. 2d 219, 184 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Sup. Ct.




agency in an expulsion or exclusion case. As a general rule only public bodies
are within the purview of the fourteenth amendmentO--the test being one of
"state action" 9 9-and private associations are not subject to its restraints. 00
But there are two exceptions. Where (a) an otherwise private organization is
performing a function which is essentially public (the "quasi-governmental
function" theory)' 0 1 or (b) a private organization pursuing purely private
activities derives a major source of power and control from the state (the
"government contacts" theory) ,102 due process may apply. There are arguments
for applying both theories to the educational accrediting agency.
(1) Quasi-Governmental Function. Two landmark Supreme Court cases
illustrate the quasi-governmental function theory. In Marsh v. Alabama,10 3
the fourteenth amendment was applied to a privately-owned company town,
apparently on the theory that it was fulfilling the same function as a public
municipality, thereby giving the public an interest in its activities equal to that
which it would have if the town were publicly owned.10 4 In Terry v. Adams,105
the Court applied the fifteenth amendment to the "Jaybird Association," a
private political organization, because its elections were an integral part of the
state's elective process with an effect equivalent to that of a public election. Both
organizations operated in an area of public concern with the tacit approval of
the state. In such cases, the underlying problem may properly be one of
determining "the extent to which the private group has moved toward a
relationship to the public which gives the public the obligation to police on a
constitutional basis"'1 6 the activities of the group.
Many of the aspects of accreditation indicate that it might be a quasi-govern-
mental function. It is doubtful that any one of them standing alone would be
sufficient to warrant application of fourteenth amendement due process,
but when viewed together, they became significant.
(a) State licensing statutes10 7 and licensing board regulations0 8 often
stipulate that a person applying for a license to practice a profession in the state
must have pursued a program of study approved by that profession's accrediting
agency.' 09 States have thereby accepted the standards of accrediting agencies
98 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-19 (1883).
99 See generally Pasley, "Exclusion and Expulsion from Non-Profit Organizations-The
Civil Rights Aspect," 14 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 203 (1965); Abernathy, "Expansion of the State
Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment," 43 Cornell L.Q. 375 (1958).
100 See, e.g., State ex reL. Dame v. LeFevre, 251 Wis. 146, 151-52, 28 N.W.2d 349, 352-53
(1947).
101 See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); cf.
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), 51 Cornell L.Q. 862 (1966).
102 See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Simkins v.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963); Guillory v. Administrators of
Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
103 Supra note 101.
104 Marsh v. Alabama, supra note 101, at 507.
1o5 Supra note 101.
106 Williams, "The Twilight of State Action," 41 Texas L. Rev. 347, 378 (1963).
107 E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-823(4) (Supp. 1965) (podiatry); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 65-1631 (1964) (pharmacy); R.I Gen. Laws Ann. § 5-25-4 (Supp. 1965) (veterinary);
W. Va. Code Ann. § 2869(b) (1961) (medicine); see Ex parte Gerino, 143 Cal. 412, 417-18,
77 Pac. 166, 168 (1904). See generally Council of State Gov'ts, Occupational Licensing
Legislation in the States (1952).
108 See Jones v. State Bd. of Medical Registration, 111 Kan. 813, 208 Pac. 639 (1922).
109 Strictly speaking, this argument for application of the 14th amendment would apply
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as criteria to be used in determining eligibility for governmental privilege.110
This being so, accrediting agencies, by providing lists of approved schools, are
assuming the state-delegated function of formulating licensing standards.1
(b) Most states charter colleges and universities within their jurisdiction." 2
Chartering is analogous to licensing; it is the grant of a state privilege
whereby the school is recognized as one fit to operate within the state. But,
in reality, effective exercise of that privilege may depend ultimately upon
the action of accrediting agencies. Their standards of educational excellence
are so heavily relied upon by the public that failure to meet them may bar
successful operation by the school. The control thereby engendered makes
the accrediting agency into a kind of secondary licensing authority; when
its standards are higher than the state's, power to allow or to curtail the
state-granted privilege is in its hands." 3
(c) Many states measure the educational quality of their own schools by
reference to the standards promulgated by the regional and national accredit-
ing agencies. This is particuarly relevant when public schools are concerned.
Professional agencies accredit undergraduate and graduate programs of state
colleges; regional agencies accredit state colleges as well as public secondary
and elementary schools." 4 In doing so with the tacit or express approval of
only to the professional accrediting agencies. But in practice it has some application to the
regional agencies as well, since they cooperate with the professional agencies in evaluating
schools and visitation committees are often composed of members of both types of agencies.
See National Commission on Accrediting, Procedures of Accrediting Education in the
Profession (a series of reports published in 1964) ; National Commission on Accrediting, supra
note 89, No. 10. Also, a person seeking a professional license must usually have attended an
accredited undergraduate college in order to be admitted to an accredited professional
school. In this sense, nonprofessional accreditation is a vital link in the process of professional
licensure.
110 See American Medical Association, A History of the Council on Medical Education
and Hospitals 24-25 (1959):
In some instances the medical practice act of the state makes the use of these lists [the
Council of Medical Education's list of approved schools] mandatory. Elsewhere they
are employed by regulation of the boards. Thus the "approved lists" of the Council
have come to have the force of law ....
See also Selden, "Where Do We Go From Here?" 29 Exceptional Children 204 (No. 5, Jan.
1963).
111 It is significant in this respect that it is the stated purpose of many accrediting agencies
to assist licensing authorities in granting state privilege. The American Council on Pharma-
ceutical Education, for example, seeks "to provide a list of accredited colleges of Pharmacy
for the use of state boards of pharmaceutical examiners .. . ." National Commission on
Accrediting, supra note 109, "Accreditation in Pharmacy" 1 (1964).
112 Selden, "The 'Place of Accreditation in the Governance of Higher Education," Liberal
Education, p. 2 (No. 3, Oct. 1964).
113 In Kurk v. Medical Society of Queens County, Inc., 46 Misc. 2d 790, 260 N.Y.S.2d 520
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 24 App. Div. 2d 897, 264 N.Y.S.2d
859 (2d Dep't 1965), a doctor licensed by the state was refused admission to the local medical
society. The exclusion had the effect of curtailing the doctor's practice, since facilities of the
area hospitals were available only to society members. The court, in compelling admission,
expressed the view that the society may have violated the doctor's 14th amendment rights.
Id. at 796, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 525-26. The court's theory seems to have been that the society, by
setting higher standards than the state, was controlling the privilege which the state had
accorded the doctor. Id. at 796-800, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 525-29. See also Note, "Judicially Com-
pelled Admission to Medical Societies," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1186, 1188 (1962).
114 E.g., the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools currently accredits 2,681
secondary schools and 870 elementary schools, most of which are public, and 411 institutions
of higher learning, many of which are public. Opinion letter of July 29, 1965, from Harry
V. Lamon, Jr., General Counsel for the Southern Association, to T. W. Bruton, Atty. Gen.
of North Carolina, on file at the Cornell Law Library.
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the state, they are setting standards for public educational institutions-
traditionally a governmental function.
But even where private schools are concerned, state reliance on the agencies
is significant. There are many specific purposes, 1 5 other than licensing, for which
various state agencies must approve schools and programs of study. Rather than
make their own evaluations, many states accept the accreditation of a private
agency."n Alternatively, if they independently evaluate schools, states may do
so on the basis of criteria established by a private agency.:1 7 In effect, many
states are allowing the accrediting agency to assume the state function of "polic-
ing" educational development within the state and evaluating it for governmental
purposes.
(2) Government Contacts. The case of Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane
Univ."8 provides an excellent example of the government contacts test as applied
in the education field. The issue was whether Tulane could be constitutionally
compelled to admit Negro students. Though the school was private, plaintiffs
alleged that it had sufficient contacts with the state to justify a finding of state
action. The court held that membership of state officials on the school board, use
of state funds and property by the school, a state tax exemption for school prop-
erty, and a reversionary interest of the state in certain school property," 9 were
not sufficient to amount to state action.
Educational accrediting agencies seemingly have more contacts with the state
than did Tulane. The arguments relating to quasi-governmental function are also
significant for purposes of the contacts approach, since these functions are a
"source of power and control12(° for the agencies. In addition, some agencies
operate largely on state funds,'21 since dues are paid by public schools which in
turn are financed by the state.' 22 State departments of education are often eligi-
ble for agency membership 123 and office-holding, 124 and their representatives
115 One example is disbursement of state scholarship funds. California, for instance,
recognizes the Western College Association for purposes of accrediting under its State
Scholarship Act. California State Senate, Report of Fact Finding Comm'n on Education 162
(Gen. Sess. 1962). Another example is approval of teacher training institutions; California
also recognizes the W.C.A. for this purpose. Id. at 159; Cal. Admin. Code, title. 5 § 821.
A third example involves eligibility for employment by state and local agencies. "Graduate
Professional Schools of Social Work," a pamphlet published in 1965 by the Council on
Social Work Education, states that "a legal status is attached to the accrediting function
in social work through legislation, rules, and regulations governing the employment of
social work personnel by federal, state, and local agencies."
3.16 Wilkins, "Accreditation in the States," in Accreditation In Higher Education 41
(Blauch, ed. 1959); see, e.g., Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 5 § 821.
117 Wilkins supra note 116.
118 212 F. Supp. 674 (EfD. La. 1962).
119 Id. at 683.
120 "What gives . .. [organizations] their constitutional character is their source of power
and control." Ibid.
121 State economic aid would not in itself be sufficient to constitute state action, unless it
were very substantial. But when economic aid is coupled with other factors, state action may
be found. See Pasley, supra note 99, at 210. See also Lewis, "The Meaning of State Action,"
60 Colum. L. Rev. 1083, 1102-08 (1960).
122 E.g., in the fiscal year 1964-65, the Southern Association was paid more than $7,000
by state-owned institutions in North Carolina alone. Memorandum of Sept. 22, 1965, from
T. W. Bruton, Atty. Gen. of North Carolina, to Thad Eure, Sec. of State of North Carolina,
on file at the Cornell Law Library.
123 See, e.g., Northwest Association of Secondary & Higher Schools, Constitution, art. III
§§ 1, 2(c) (rev. 1960); Southern Association of Colleges & Schools, By-Laws, art. IV § 4.01.
124 Id. § 4.03.
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may be appointed to agency commissions. 1 25 And finally, educational accrediting
associations are intimately, though indirectly, connected with the distribution
of funds under federal "aid-to-education" statutes. 126 Most of these statutes
provide that only accredited schools are eligible for federal aid,127 and since
programs are administered through the states, accreditation becomes a screening
procedure in the state's selection process.' 2 8
Taken together, the above arguments indicate that either under the quasi-
governmental power theory, the government contacts theory, or a combination
of the two, an accrediting agency's action might be tantamount to state action.
If so, then to the extent, if any, that procedural safeguards at the lower two
levels do not secure rights to proper notice and fair hearing for an expelled or
excluded school, fourteenth amendment due process may be able to fill the void.
III
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF ACCREDITATION
Even if the activities of the regional and professional accrediting agencies
do not amount to state action, they are nevertheless affected with a public
interest to a significant degree. The previous section has examined the quasi-
public character of private accrediting agencies and enumerated their many
contacts with both federal and state governments. An earlier section has explored
the monopolistic tendencies implicit in accreditation.1 29 While these facets of the
accrediting process indicate that the agencies are susceptible to governmental
regulation, such regulation has not as yet been implemented on a large scale
at either the federal or the state level.
125 The Commission on Secondary Schools of the Southern Association has, as a member,
"the person from each state connected with the state department of education who shall be
the state director of secondary schools . . . ." By-laws, art. VII § 703 (a) (1). See also
Northwest Association of Secondary & Higher Schools, Constitution, art. V § 6(a) (rev. 1960).
126 See text accompanying notes 175-86 infra.
127 E.g., Section 401 of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 374, 20
U.S.C. § 751 (1964) reads in pertinent part:
As used in this chapter-
(f) the term "institution of higher education" means any educational institution in any
state which-
(5) is accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting agency or association listed by
the Commissioner pursuant to this paragraph ....
128 Strictly speaking, accreditation in this light is closer to federal than to state action. But
it is relevant for our purposes because it restricts the state's ability to select applicants for
its alloted share of the federal funds. See Simpkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323
F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), where a private hospital was held subject to the fourteenth amend-
ment because it was an integral part of a state-federal plan to allocate federal funds for the
construction of hospitals. It should also be noted that the federal aid-to-education statutes
raise the question of applicability of fifth amendment due process to educational accrediting
agencies. The fifth amendment was also applied to the private hospital in the Cone case. An
affirmative argument would be bolstered by the fact that accrediting agencies are officially
recognized by the United States Commissioner of Education. See notes 176-78 infra and
accompanying text. Furthermore, some of the agencies finance their accrediting activities
partly with federal grants. See, e.g., National Commission on Accrediting, "Accreditation in
Psychology," p. 4 (pamph., March 1964).
129 See text accompanying notes 72-82 supra.
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A. State Regulation of Accrediting Agencies and Activities
The United States Constitution neither delegates power to regulate education
to the federal government nor prohibits it to the states. Presumably, then, the
power resides in the states by virtue of the tenth amendment. 30 Since education
has traditionally been affected with a public interest, state regulation of it is
an adjunct of the police power 131 and subject to the limitations normally placed
on that power. In other words, regulation must be reasonable, rather than arbi-
trary and capricious, 132 and must bear a real and substantial relation to the evils
it was enacted to eradicate.133 Within this framework, there appear to be three
primary methods by which a state can control, to varying extents, the private
accreditation activities carried on within its borders: (1) indirect regulation
through competition-the establishment of state (public) accrediting agencies;
(2) direct regulation through legislation specifically aimed at private accrediting
agencies; and (3) regulation through use of statutes applicable to corporations
and associations in general.
(1) Establishment of State Accrediting Agencies. State legislatures can indi-
rectly regulate accrediting agencies by delegating to a state agency the authority
to establish accrediting procedures and standards. Though such action would
undoubtedly detract from the importance of private associations, 134 it would not
alleviate the need for uniformity throughout the states. If educational standards
are to be widely relied upon, they cannot vary from state to state. Absent the
creation of a multi-state educational agency, only the private accrediting associa-
tions are capable of maintaining the necessary uniformity over a wide geographi-
cal area. 135
It is clear that a state is able, under the police power, to implement procedures
for qualitatively evaluating private educational institutions.136 Establishment
130 This is not to say that the federal government has no interest in education nor any
ability to regulate it by various means. As to the federal government's participation in the
accrediting process, see text accompanying notes 170-86 infra.
131 See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); State v. Wiliams, 253 N.C.
337, 117 S.E.2d 444 (1960); Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 81 A.2d 226 (1951); 47 Am.
Jur. "Schools" § 221 (1943). Of course, if the question were regulation of a purely public
school, or of purely public education in general, legislative power would be complete, absent
some limitation in the' state or federal constitution. South Dakota H.S. Interscholastic
Activities Ass'n v. St. Mary's Inter-Parochial High School, 141 N.W.2d 477, 480 (S.D. 1966).
Police power limitations apply only to regulation of private schools and private educational
activities. Ibid.
132 Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); Grow
System School v. Board of Regents, 277 App. Div. 122, 98 N.Y.S.2d 834 (3d Dep't 1950).
133 State v. Williams, supra note 131; Grow System School v. Board of Regents, supra
note 132; Columbia Trust Co. v. Lincoln Institute, 138 Ky. 804, 811, 129 S.W. 113, 115
(1910).
134 California State Senate, Report of Senate Fact Finding Committee on Education 147
(Gen. Sess. 1962) ("State accreditation could do much to negate the accomplishment of the
federally recognized private accrediting agencies which have done a yeoman's job in building
and maintaining the quality of higher education ....").
135 See Selden, "Government Concern with Accreditation," New England Ass'n Review 8
(May, 1960).
136 Grow System School v. Board of Regents, supra note 132, at 125, 98 N.Y.S.2d at 837:
It may well be that the power to regulate certain phases of private school operation
such as the nature of curriculum, the qualifications of teachers and the like, is a neces-
sary and indispensable corollary to the State's supervisory jurisdiction over education
in general.
Cf. note 131 supra.
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of minimum standards is directed at elimination of fraudulent degree-granting
institutions which cause harm both to the student and to persons relying on
their degrees. 137 Since it is within the public interest to control such an evil,
states can do so if their regulatory provisions are reasonable.
At present New York is the only state which has instituted comprehensive
regulation of educational quality.138 Though in most states some agency has
been authorized to carry out actual accreditation of one form or another, 39 the
authority is often utilized only to a limited extent or not at all.' 40 Frequently the
state will choose to rely on the private accrediting agencies.14 ' A few years ago,
for example, the Fact Finding Committee on Education of the California State
Senate held extensive hearings on the advisability of state reliance upon the
accreditation activities of the Western College Association (the regional agency
which accredits California schools).142 It concluded that "there is no necessity
for the State to enter directly into the accrediting field, and it should not
do so."'1 43
(2) Direct Legislative Regulation of Accrediting Agencies..The second means
by which states can regulate accrediting is through direct legislative supervision
of the voluntary agencies. The extent to which this can be done depends upon
the public or quasi-public status of the agencies.' 44 If, under an extreme view,
they were considered to be public bodies, legislative control over them would
not be restrained by the traditional limits placed upon the police power,' 45 since
police power limitations are inapplicable where private rights are not being
affected.
In South Dakota H.S. Interscholastic Ass'n v. St. Mary's Inter-Parochial High
School,146 the court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute147 making
all accredited private high schools eligible for membership in the plaintiff asso-
137 See generally California State Senate, supra note 134, at 146-47.
138 The New York Board of Regents exercises authority over all educational institutions
within the state, both public and private. In conjunction with its authority over professional
licensing, the Board registers (a form of accreditation) professional programs of study
offered in educational institutions throughout the world. See Selden, Accreditation: A Struggle
Over Standards in Higher Education 51-53 (1960).
'39 E.g., Cal. Ed. Code § 13101; S.D. Code § 15.0905 (Supp. 1960); New Rev. Stat.
§§ 79-328, 79-1247.02 (Supp. 1963) ; see generally Wilkins, supra note 116, at 31-34.
140 Selden, noting that state regulation has been irregularly exercised, stated:
It is true that in most states an institution must first obtain a legal charter before it may
offer instruction and award degrees. It is also true that in many states colleges and uni-
versities are subject to approval, registration, review or accreditation, as the terms are
used in different states, by officially designated legal authorities. Despite the legal basis
for these controls they are not enforced with any consistency throughout the country,
and in some states their enforcement is so lax that it would be considered ludicrous if it
were not a matter of serious threat to the social welfare.
Selden, "The Place of Accreditation in the Governance of Higher Education," Liberal
Education, p. 2 (No. 3, Oct. 1964). See also California State Senate, supra note 134, at 146.
141 See notes 115-17 supra and accompanying text.
142 California State Senate, supra note 134, at 145-67.
'43 Id. at 147.
144 See the discussion of the exclusion cases at text accompanying notes 72-79 supra, and
the discussion of state action at text accompanying notes 98-128 supra. See also text accom-
panying notes 131-33 supra.
145 Waugh v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Mississippi, 237 U.S. 589, 595-97 (1915); South
Dakota H.S. Interscholastic Activities Ass'n v. St. Mary's Inter-Parochial High School, 141
N.W.2d 477, 480 (S.D. '1966).
146 141 N.W.2d 477 (S.D. 1966).
147 S.D. Laws of 1964, Ch. 51.
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ciation. Plaintiff was a private organization designed to coordinate interscho-
lastic activities within the state. However, it was run by public school officials,
and only public schools, upon a two-thirds vote of existing members, could be
admitted to membership. The court held that the extent of the state police power
was not relevant and that the public character of the association,148 together
with the monopoly power it exhibited in controlling interscholastic activities1 49
justified the statute.
The regional and national accrediting agencies are not as "public" as the South
Dakota association, since so many of the colleges accredited by them are pri-
vate.150 It does not appear that they can be regulated to the same degree, though
such an argument seemingly could be made.185 More likely, state regulation of
their activities must be based upon the police power' 52 and is necessarily limited
by the traditional restraints upon that power.'8 3 At any rate, the encompassing
nature of the public interest in the field of educational accredition 54 furnishes a
broad base for exercising the police power. The distinction between absolute
legislative power and the police power is therefore of little significance.
(3) Application of General Corporation and Association Statutes. There is
little statutory law attempting to regulate the organization or operation of non-
profit associations, and the few statutory schemes which do exist are not at all
comprehensive. 8 5 But most of the accrediting agencies are incorporated,'5 8
and the corporation statutes' 57 and procedural provisions' s which apply to
them because of their corporate character are somewhat more significant. Never-
theless, these statutes concentrate upon the structures and internal operating
procedures of nonprofit corporations, and do little to substantively control their
activities.' 9
148 South Dakota H.S. Interscholastic Activities Ass'n v. St. Mary's Inter-Parochial High
School, supra note 145.
149 Id. at 481.
150 The fact that a private university is chartered by the state and has an educational
purpose does not make it public. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819); Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962). See
generally Comment, 10 S.D.L. Rev. 102 (1965).
.51 Since many of the regional associations accredit high schools (most of which are public)
as well as colleges, there is a better argument for including them within the reasoning of the
South Dakota Interscholastic case than there is for including professional associations.
152 See State v. Nuss, 79 S.D. 522, 114 N.W.2d 633 (1962) and cases cited note 132 supra.
153 See notes 132-33 supra and accompanying text.
154 See text accompanying notes 72-79, 98-128 supra.
155 See, e.g., Cal. Corps. Code, §§ 21000-21401; NJ. Rev. Stat. Ann., §§ 15:1-15:16 (NJ.
Ass'ns Not for Profit Law).
156 See note 33 supra.
157 See Boyer, Nonprofit Corporation Statutes: A Critique and Proposal 245-53 (1957);
Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations and Associations 8-12 (1956), for detailed compilations of
the state statutes.
158 Once incorporated, an accrediting agency is unquestionably a legal entity for purposes
of service of process and for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Unincorporated associations,
on the other hand, are treated by some states as aggregates of individuals for purposes of
suit, Developments in the Law, "Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations," 76
Harv. L. Rev. 983, 1081-82 (1963), and are treated by the federal courts as aggregates for
purposes of diversity juridiction. United Steelworkers v. Bouligny, 382 U.S. 145 (1965), 51
Cornell L.Q. 827 (1966). Also, incorporation is usually sufficient to bring an association
within the terms of state statutes codifying the common law writs of mandamus (see, e.g.,
N.Y. Civ. Prac. §§ 7801-06 and 8 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil Practice
§ 7802.01 (1964)) and quo warranto (see, e.g., Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 2038 (1951)).
159 The variation in the nature and purposes of nonprofit corporations makes it difficult to
formulate all-inclusive statutory schemes. In encountering this problem, most states have
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Foreign corporation qualification statutes are perhaps the most important of
the general statutes. 60 Historically, states have made no attempt to apply these
provisions to educational accrediting agencies.161 One recent incident, however,
may forecast greater state effort in this area. North Carolina requested the
Southern Association of Schools and Colleges, one of the six regional associations,
to qualify pursuant to a "conducting affairs" statute.162 Though the Southern
Association argued in an opinion letter to the Secretary of State that the
qualification statute did not apply to its activities, the Secretary's opinion did
not change. 16 Court action was avoided when the Southern Association
voluntarily qualified and paid the fees.
Generally, if a corporation "transacts business" or is "doing business"
within the state, it may be required to qualify. It would seem that these terms-
containing the word "business"-comprehend some form of commercial transac-
tion for profit. However, early decisions were consistent in holding that the
qualification provisions applied to nonprofit corporations as well as to corpora-
tions for profit.'
64
Though it can be argued that the "conducting affairs" test of the North Caro-
lina statute requires fewer contacts with the state than does a "doing business"
test,165 it seems that the criteria should be the same.' 66 Whatever the test, an
attempted to define nonprofit corporations either (a) in terms of their purposes, e.g.,
religious, educational, scientific, or social, or (b) merely in terms of the lack of financial profit
for the members. See Legislation, "Nonprofit Corporations-Definitions," 17 Vand. L. Rev.
336 (1963), which cites and analyzes the various statutory provisions. Accrediting agencies
definitely fall into the latter category and may, depending upon the state's interpretation of
"educational," fall into the former.
160 Due to the protection of the Constitution's privileges and immunities clause, there
have been few attempts to subject noncorporate organizations to qualification statutes.
Recently New Hampshire has enacted a partnership qualification statute, N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. Ch. 305A (Supp. 1965), but the constitutionality of this statute is somewhat doubtful.
Though the nonprofit association possesses many more corporate attributes than does the
partnership, and thus would be more likely to meet the Constitution's requirements regarding
qualification, this question has not been answered. See Note, 52 Cornell L.Q. 157 (1966).
161 Of the educational accrediting agencies from which questionnaires were received, only
one (see text accompanying notes 162-63 infra) has been required to qualify formally in a
foreign state. Qualification statutes are to be distinguished from "assumed name" statutes,
which apply to nonprofit organizations. See Annot., 45 A.L.R. 198 (1926).
162 North Carolina's Non-Profit Corporation Act provides that "a foreign corporation
shall procure a certificate of authority from the Secretary of State before it shall conduct
affairs in this state." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55A-58 (1965). The Secretary of State is directed to
require all such corporations to comply. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55A-76(d) (1965).
163 See opinion letter of July 29, 1965, from Harry V. Lamon, Jr., Gen. Counsel for the
Southern Ass'n, to T. W. Bruton, Atty. Gen. N.C., on file at the Cornell Law Library.
Perhaps the threat of the Southern Association to disaccredit North Carolina University
(see text accompanying notes 24-25 supra) was linked to this request for qualification. By
forcing qualification, North Carolina obtained a simple method of service of process if
any actions were contemplated, and a very limited degree of regulatory power.
164 General Conference v. Berkey, 156 Cal. 466, 105 Pac. 411 (1909); State v. Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan, 117 Kan. 564, 232 Pac. 254 (1925); Pacific Wool Growers v. Commis-
sioner, 305 Mass. 197, 25 N.E.2d 208 (1940); Pierce v. Grand Army of the Republic, 220
Minn. 552, 20 N.W.2d 489 (1945); Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Commonwealth, 138 Va.
500, 122 S.E. 122 (1924); Pacific Typesetting Co. v. International Typographical Union, 125
Wash. 273, 216 Pac. 358 (1923). But see Eaton v. Woman's Home Missionary Soc'y, 264 IMI.
88, 105 N.E. 746 (1914); City of San Antonio v. Salvation Army, 127 S.W. 860 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1910). The rationale advanced is that a corporation is "doing business" if it conducts
activity in promotion of the purposes for which it was organized, whether or not those
purposes are for pecuniary gain.
165 The "conducting affairs" test was first adopted in the Model Non-Profit Corporation
Act, and is now the test in eight states other than North Carolina. See note 157 supra.
166 There are no judicial opinions comparing the two phrases. The North Carolina
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accrediting agency's normal activities in a particular state do not appear to meet
it. The primary contact an accrediting agency has with a foreign state is
through its visitation committees, 16 7 which spend two or three days observ-
ing and interviewing at an applicant school. The committees are not com-
posed of employees of the accrediting agencies but of college professors and
administrators, and of members of professions whose programs of study are
being examined. Furthermore, these committees make no final decisions as to
accreditation; their reports are forwarded to the agency's headquarters, where
they are combined with a great deal of other information which is relevant
in making the final decision. There is considerable authority that the mere
entering of a state to gather information does not constitute "doing business.' 168
Though the visitation committee may inspect schools within a particular state
throughout the year, thereby fulfilling the "continuous contact" requirement
of the doing-business test, all other elements traditionally considered to be
determinative of that test are lacking.169
B. Federal Regulation of Accrediting Agencies and Activities
The federal government does not, and never has, assumed a major role in the
accreditation process. 70 Its restraint stems from a long tradition of state and
local control of education1 7 ' as well as from a realization that greater activity in
the area would have "serious educational and political implications.' 72
Attorney General has contended that the "conducting affairs" test requires fewer contacts. See
Memorandum from Att'y Gen. of North Carolina to Secretary of State of North Carolina,
Sept. 22, 1965, on file at the Cornell Law Library. It can also be argued, however, that it re-
quires more contacts, since the criteria for nonprofit corporations should be narrower than
for profit corporations. Qualification statutes are primarily aimed at obtaining an agent for
service of process so that residents who transact business with a foreign corporation may
obtain jurisdiction over it. The relatively few possibilities for suit against a nonprofit
corporation, as compared with the many suits arising out of the activities of a corporation
for profit, might warrant a narrower test.
167 According to the questionnaires received, the great majority of accrediting agencies
maintain permanent offices in only one state, generally the state of incorporation. Therefore,
this cannot often be used as the basis for requiring qualification.
168 See, e.g., Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc. v. Terminal Warehouse Co., 207 Wis. 467, 240
N.W. 796 (1932). Defendant corporation was found not to be doing business when its
employees secured data and information for use by executives in another state. See also
Walker v. General Features Corp., 319 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1963); Aero Service Corp. v.
Benson, 84 Idaho 416, 374 P.2d 277 (1962).
169 Even though an accrediting agency is not "doing business" for purposes of qualification,
it may still be "doing business" for purposes of in personam jurisdiction. It is well established
that the test for the latter requires fewer contacts than the test for the former. Yet it seems
that the normal accrediting agency may not be doing even enough business in a particular
foreign state to subject it to personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kane v. Stockbridge School, 33
Misc. 2d 103, 228 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1962), where the court concluded
that the defendant nonprofit corporation was not "doing business" where its sole contact
was the holding of interviews with prospective students. See also Weinburg v. Colonial
Williamsburg, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 633 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); Benson v. Brattleboro Retreat, 103
N.H. 28, 164 A.2d 560 (1960); Zucker v. Baker, 35 Misc. 2d 841, 231 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County, 1962); Note, 51 Cornell L.Q. 586 (1966). If the suit is based upon
wrongful exclusion or expulsion, it would also be difficult to subject accrediting agencies to
jurisdiction based upon long-arm, single-act statutes. Since so much information other than
that gathered by the visitation committee is used in making a decision on accreditation, it is
at least doubtful that the cause of action "arises out of" the visitation.
170 See generally Sanders, "The United States Office of Education and Accreditation,"
in Accreditation in Higher Education 15-21 (Blauch, ed. 1959) ; Selden, supra note 138, ch. 5.
171 Sanders, supra note 170, at 15; Selden, supra note 138, at 45; see text accompanying
notes 130-31 supra.
172 Sanders, supra note 170, at 21.
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At present, no federal agency 'has authority to regulate directly the activities
of educational accrediting agencies,17 3 nor is it likely that legislative proposals to
bestow such authority are forthcoming.174Nevertheless, some indirect regulatory
power has been obtained through provisions in federal aid-to-education statutes,
and recently, federal antitrust laws have been mentioned as a potential source of
additional regulatory power.
(1) Accreditation and the Aid-to-Education Statutes. Statutes providing for
distribution of funds to educational institutions evidence the federal govern-
ment's concern with accreditation. These statutes, through the exercise of "purse-
strings" control, 7 have given the United States Office of Education an enhanced
role in the accrediting process. Through their provisions, the Commissioner of
Education has two major methods of indirectly regulating accrediting agencies:
(a) by a process of official recognition; and (b) by the use of limited power to
accredit schools for purposes of federal-aid eligibility.
(a) Official Recognition. The Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952
authorized the Commissioner to "publish a list of nationally recognized accredit-
ing agencies and associations which he determines to be reliable authority as to
the quality of training offered by an educational institution .. ".. ,176 Similar
authorization has been extended to him in subsequent educational legislation.- 77
Since a grant of federal funds usually depends in part upon the accredited status
of the institution, and since the statutes prescribe that accreditation must come
from an agency recognized by the Commissioner 78 his power can be quite
significant. Obviously, a private agency's status is increased by delegating to it
the responsibility for determining who is eligible for financial aid; it follows
that denial of such responsibility, or the threat of denial, can create an important
regulatory influence upon the agencies.
(b) Accreditation Power of the Commissioner. Except for limited functions
under recent statutory provisions, the Office of Education does not itself accredit
educational institutions. On only one occasion has it ever attempted to do so. In
the early 1900's, what was then the Bureau of Education prepared a list of
173 See Letter of March 8, 1966, from Peter P. Muirhead, Associate Comm'r for Higher
Education of the U.S. Office of Education, to Congressman Howard W. Robison of New
York, on file at the Cornell Law Library. See also California State Senate, supra note 134, at
145-46.
174 See memorandum of May 19, 1966, from the Education and Public Welfare Division,
Legislative Reference Service Library of Congress, to Congressman Howard W. Robison of
New York, in which it was stated that "to the best of our knowledge, there have been no
legislative proposals in this area, and we have neither 'heard' nor read anything indicating
that such proposals are likely to be forthcoming." The memorandum is on file at the Cornell
Law Library.
175 Purse-strings control is the most likely method by which the federal government
could influence education and private accrediting bodies in particular. Since the regional and
national associations are interstate in nature, the interstate commerce clause is another possible
source of power. But it is not likely that accreditation is itself commerce, and the effect it
has upon commerce is difficult to ascertain.
176 38 U.S.C. § 1653(a) (1964).
177 See, e.g., 79 Stat. 1251 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 403 (Supp. I 1965) ; 77 Stat. 374 (1963), 20
U.S.C. § 751(f) (1964); 79 Stat. 1247 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 1085 (Supp. I 1965); 79 Stat.
1269 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 1141 (Supp. I 1965); 79 Stat. 679 (1965), 15 U.S.C. § 1352 (Supp.
I 1965).
178 79 Stat. 1247 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 1085 (Supp. I 1965) ; 77 Stat. 374 (1963), 20 U.S.C.
§ 751(f) (1964) ; 79 Stat. 1251 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 403 (Supp. I 1965) ; 79 Stat. 1037 (1965)
20 U.S.C. §§ 981-96 (Supp. I 1965); 79 Stat. 1269 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 1141 (Supp. I 1965).
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classified colleges.' 79 Strong opposition to it induced President Taft to withhold
publication, and when President Wilson took office he also refused to release the
list. Though the list never was published, the episode emphasized the need for a
reliable measure of educational quality and spurred the development of accredi-
tation by private groups. Similarly, it helped define the more passive role of
data-gatherer and disseminator, in aid of private groups, for the Office of Edu-
cation.180
Yet, with the growing importance of federal aid to education, the Office has
become more active in rating schools. Its activity takes one of two basic forms.
Under some statutes the Commissioner can set his own standards if there is no
recognized agency to accredit schools in a particular category.' 81 Though these
provisions give the Commissioner actual accreditation power, it is quite limited.
But by exercising restraint in the recognition of accrediting agencies, the Com-
missioner could broaden it considerably.
The Commissioner's second form of accreditation power operates when an
applicant for federal aid is unaccredited but there is a recognized agency in the
o field. Under these provisions, if the Commissioner determines that there is
"satisfactory assurance" that a school will meet the agency's accreditation
standards "within a reasonable time," it will be deemed to be accredited for
purposes of federal grants under the applicable statute. 8 2 The power is signifi-
cant, since it may be used to bestow a kind of official governmental status upon
an unaccredited school. Carried to its extreme, it could considerably weaken the
179 Schools were placed into one of four categories, the sole criterion being the success of
their graduates in master's degree programs. Selden, supra note 138, at 46.
180 Sanders, supra note 170, at 17-20; Selden, supra note 138, at 46-47.
181 79 Stat. 1247 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 1085(a) (Supp. I 1965) (reduced-interest student
loan insurance under Higher Education Resources and Student Assistance Act):
If the Commissioner determines that . . . there is no nationally recognized accrediting
agency or association qualified to accredit schools in [a particular] . . . category, he
shall, pending the establishment of such an accrediting agency or association, appoint
an advisory committee, composed of persons specially qualified to evaluate training
provided by schools in such category, which shall (i) prescribe the standards of content,
scope, and quality which must be met in order to qualify schools in such category to
participate in the program pursuant to this part, and (ii) determine whether particular -
schools . . . meet those standards.
For provisions to the same effect, see 79 Stat. 1048 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 996(a) (Supp. I 1965)
(vocational student loan insurance); 79 Stat. 1251 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 403(b) (Supp. I 1965)
(national defense loans and fellowships); 77 Stat. 76 (1963), 20 U.S.C. § 751(f)(5) (1964)
(Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963); 79 Stat. 679 (1965), 15 U.S.C. § 1352 (Supp. I
1965) (State Technical Services Act of 1965).
182 79 Stat. 1251 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 403(b) (Supp. I 1965) (national defense loans and
fellowships under the Higher Education Resources and Student Assistance Act):
The term 'institution of higher education' means an educational institution in any
State which . . . (5) is accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting agency or
association approved by the Commissioner for this purpose or, if not so accredited, (A)
is an institution with respect to which the Commissioner has determined that there is
satisfactory assurance, considering the resources available to the institution, the period
of time, if any, during which it has operated, the effort it is making to meet accredita-
tion standards, and the purpose for which this determination is being made, that the
institution will meet the accreditation standards of such an agency or association
within a reasonable time ....
See also 79 Stat. 1247 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 1085(a) (5) (A) (Supp. I 1965); 77 Stat. 376
(1963), 20 U.S.C. § 751(f) (5) (1964); 79 Stat. 1226 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 1026 (Supp. I




significance of accreditation by the private accrediting agencies, detracting from
their importance in the same manner that state accreditation would.' 8
The federal-aid statutes indicate, however, that the relationship between the
Office of Education and the national and regional accrediting agencies is one of
cooperation rather than competition. The statutes explicitly make accreditation
by private agencies a foremost standard in identifying schools eligible for federal
grants.'8 4 Even when the Commissioner deems a school to be accredited by virtue
of its satisfactory progress, the standards of the accrediting body, not those of
the Commissioner, provide the measure of progress.185 And in many instances
statutes explicitly require that an institution shall be deemed accredited only
"after consultation with the appropriate accreditation body or bodies ... ."186
It appears that the power to recognize accreditation, bestowed on the Commis-
sioner by virtue of these statutes, was not intended to be used as a regulatory
device, but rather is a necessary aspect of the implementation of federal
programs.
(2) Accreditation and the Antitrust Laws. In order to apply for accreditation
by one of the six regional agencies, the interested institution must be a non-
profit organization. 87 Because of this policy, Marjorie Webster Junior College,
Inc., a closely-held business corporation, was recently denied accreditation by the
Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc.188 As a result
of this denial, Marjorie Webster has brought an action against Middle States, 8 9
alleging violations of Section 3 of the Sherman Act, 190 and praying that
Middle States be enjoined from including the "nonprofit" criterion among its
standards. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Middle States and the other
regional agencies "have unlawfully agreed, combined and conspired for the
purpose of restraining the trade of proprietary institutions of higher education
.. and for the further purpose of monopolizing and attempting to monopolize
for non-profit institutions the field of higher education ... 2,191
This attempt to invoke the antitrust laws raises the question of whether educa-
tion falls within the meaning of "trade" or "commerce" as used in the Sherman
Act. The successful use of the antitrust laws to challenge restraints in the dis-
183 See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
184 See statutes cited in note 178 supra.
185 See note 182 supra and accompanying text.
188 79 Stat. 1056 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 293a(b) (1) (B) (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 293a(b) (1) (B) (Supp. I 1965); 79 Stat. 1053 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 29Sf (3) (b)(2) (Supp. I
1965); 78 Stat. 918 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 298(b)(f) (1964). See also 79 Stat. 1229 (1965), 20
U.S.C. § 1052(c) (Supp. I 1965). Peter P. Muirhead, Associate Comm'r for Higher Educa-
tion of the Office of Education, has said that "the certification of satisfactory assurance by the
accrediting agencies represents a significant departure from their previous practices but is
a tribute to their cooperativeness rather than a response to Federal regulation." Letter of
March 8, 1966, to Congressman Howard W. Robison of New York, on file at the Cornell
Law Library.
187 See complaint, p. 7, allegation 7(b) and (c), Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v.
Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, Civil No. 1515-66, U.S. Dist. Ct.,
D.C. (filed June 10, 1966).
188 See text accompanying notes 28-29, 82 supra.
189 Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle State Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary
Schools, Civil No. 1515-66, U.S. Dist. Ct., D.C. (complaint filed June 10, 1966).
190 26 Stat. 209 (1890); 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1964).
191 Complaint, p. 5, allegation 4, Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States
Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, supra note 189.
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semination of news items 19 2 and in the production of sporting events 93 gives
some support to an argument that education is within the purview of the act.
Those cases indicate that application of the antitrust laws is not restricted to the
sale of material goods such as automobiles, and it seems, therefore, that whether
the Sherman Act applies to the "sale" of education for profit is at least an open
question.
A second issue in the Marjorie Webster case is whether the restraint (assuming
it is covered by the Sherman Act) is unreasonable. 194 It is arguable that govern-
ance by a board of directors representing the financial interests of the share-
holders interferes with the quality of education, and that it is therefore reason-
able for an accrediting agency to create and enforce a standard recognizing this
fact. On the other hand, it might seem unreasonable to refuse even to accept an
application from a proprietary school. Even assuming that most proprietary
schools do not merit accreditation, this might not justify the refusal to accredit
a school meeting the qualitative standards of the agency simply because it is a
business corporation. Whatever the outcome, Marjorie Webster, should provide
an interesting analysis of the applicability of the federal antitrust laws to educa-
tion and their possible use to regulate educational accrediting agencies.
IV
RECOmmENDATIONS
Educational accrediting agencies thrive on autonomy, and rightly so. As Pro-
fessor Chafee wrote many years ago:
The value of autonomy is a final reason which may incline the courts to
leave associations alone . . . .Like individuals, they will usually do most
for the community if they are free to determine their own lives for the
present and the future. A due regard for the corresponding interests of
others is desirable, but must be somewhat enforced by public opinion. 95
Due to the special competence of educational accrediting agencies, this
autonomy is of paramount importance. "The courts, like the legislatures, can
hardly profess to be better qualified to decide how teaching shall be carried on
than are the teachers and their administrative associates." 96 But this does not
mean that courts should never interfere; the monopoly power of the agencies,
coupled with the public function they fulfill, may make some supervision
necessary. The extent of supervision, however, should be carefully limited. Courts
should seek to distinguish between the "substance"'19 7 and the "procedure' 98
of agency activities. If a very restrictive role is taken as to the former, and an
192 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
193 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
194 For a recent discussion of reasonableness and lack of anticompetitive purpose as de-
fenses to suits under the Sherman Act, in a context similar to Marjorie Webster, see Deesen
v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. Week 3113
(U.S. Oct. 11, 1966).
195 Chafee, "The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit," 43 Harv. L. Rev. 993,
1027 (1930).
196 Id. at 1028-29.
197 "Substance" refers to the actual standards or policies of the agency-its measurement
of educational quality and the methods, in general, by which it determines what these
measures should be and how they should be implemented.




active role as to the latter, courts will be able to preserve group autonomy on
the one hand while protecting the public interest on the other.
In the substantive area, expertise is prominent and should be given free rein,
so long as the agency is in fact relying on that expertise. The court's role should
be limited to balancing the factors discussed earlier,199 in order to determine:
(1) whether it should accept jurisdiction over the dispute, and (2) whether, on
the merits, the exclusion or expulsion should be invalidated. As regards procedure,
however, the three levels of procedural safeguards 200 are important, and courts
should be careful to see that all of them (assuming the highest level is found
to apply) are followed. This will assure that fair methods are used and that
each interested school is given ample opportunity to present its case. Such super-
vision should do much to protect the public's interest, yet it does not prevent
the experts from originally setting and enforcing their own standards without
court modification.
Little distinction should be made between exclusion and expulsion. A school
whose accreditation has been withdrawn has only a slightly better argument
for court intervention than does a school which has been denied accreditation-
that argument stemming from past compliance with and reliance upon the
accrediting agency's rules and policies. Ultimately, however, this factor must
yield to the public interest factor. All schools are equally concerned with the
activity of accrediting agencies; their successful operation may depend on it. And
the concern of the public is the same, whether the school is accredited or not. All
schools, therefore, should receive equal treatment in situations where accredita-
tion is at stake.
To the extent that some control over the general policies and functions of an
accrediting agency (i.e., the "substance") is needed, state regulation by legisla-
tures and departments of education poses a better alternative than does judicial
supervision. Legislators and administrators are more likely to respond to public
opinion and to invoke the recommendations of experts. But state regulation
should seldom be necessary and should be kept to a minimum. Educational
accrediting agencies are regional and national in scope; regulation by different
states would hinder the uniformity so necessary to an agency's effective function-
ing, would lessen the possibilities of autonomous operation, and would make
cooperation among colleges more difficult. The answer may be one of respectful
cooperation with government rather than one of regulation by government.201
At the state level, accrediting agencies foster cooperation between themselves and
state departments of education and licensing boards. At the national level, the
National Commission on Accrediting cooperates with the Office of Education and
fosters cooperation among all accrediting agencies, professional as well as
199 See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra.
200 See text accompanying notes 83-128 supra.
201 This does not mean that government should be inactive as far as accreditation is
concerned. Legislation can and should actively support the functioning of the private accredit-
ing agencies. The federal aid-to-education statutes (see text accompanying notes 175-86)
illustrate this type of government support at the federal level; professional licensing statutes
(see notes 107-11 and accompanying text) do so at the state level. This could also be the
best technique for regulating the accrediting agencies if such regulation were to become
necessary. By withdrawing or extending (or threatening withdrawal of or suggesting extension
of) the powers granted to accrediting agencies by statute or administrative rules, state and
federal governments can exert a persuasive influence on the agencies.
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regional. An interlocking framework of cooperation-among the agencies and
between agency and government-overseen by the National Commission, would
provide the most workable solution. Through such a framework, independence
can be maintained, yet responsiveness to the public interest can be preserved.
The courts and legislatures should need to examine the operation of the system
only occasionally in order to keep it running smoothly. The private educational
accrediting agency, then, can continue to develop as the uniquely-American
method for maintaining standards of educational quality.
William A. Kaplin
J. Philip Hunter
